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This study’s central focus is to examine the perceptions of two communities in coastal Kenya 
concerning the reintegration of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The study identifies 
the need for more concerted government–community relations to overcome some imminent 
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Abstract 
This study explores community perceptions of reintegration of returning foreign terrorist 
fighters (FTFs) from Al-Shabaab in coastal Kenya. Drawing from fieldwork accounts 
collected in Kwale and Mombasa Counties, Kenya, this study nuances and problematizes 
communities’ perception of reintegration.  The study fits into a growing yet unsettled 
discourse of what works well in reintegration initiatives for returning foreign terrorist 
fighters. Governments worldwide are focusing on fighting Islamist terror groups like ISIS 
and Al-Shabaab in East Africa. But the need to also build other strategic counter-terrorism 
capabilities has developed, even more so in the rehabilitation and reintegration of returning 
foreign terrorist fighters. How host communities perceive this shift from a whole-of-
government, hard approach, to a whole-of-community, soft approach, will determine how 
effective this strategy is in the global fight against terrorism. In Kenya, it is estimated that 
at least 1,000 returnees live in communities along the coastal areas of Kwale and Mombasa. 
There is a paucity of research focusing on the perceptions of those communities absorbing 
the returnees in Kenya. This study draws on 31 interviews with government officials, 
returnees, academic experts, civil society actors, and 104 questionnaire interviews with 
community members in Kwale and Mombasa. The study’s findings show that while the 
family and the society at large may be longing to see their loved ones, there are competing 
dilemmas involved, including stigma and negative labelling. The study also found that there 
is a lack of structures to ensure proper involvement of host communities in the reintegration 
of returnees. As such, the process is marred by lack of trust and negative labelling, which 
affects positive reintegration. The study’s findings are useful for counter-radicalization 
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reintegration barriers. It observes broadly that negative perceptions exist around returnees. 
The dilemmas explored here, while valid, speak to the need for a whole-of-community 
approach to address this growing phenomenon. The scope of the present research was coastal 
Kenya (Mombasa and Kwale Counties). These two regions have been named as hotspots of 
violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya. Media reports and academic research point out 
these two Counties as the regions where most fighters return as well. There are considerable 
estimates of at least 1,000 returnees in the coastal region of Kenya (Mkutu & Opondo, 2019). 
Both Mombasa and Kwale Counties have a couple of reintegration initiatives set up by local 
governments and local non-governmental organizations.  
This study uses the term foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) to denote those individuals 
who travel abroad, to join terror groups, and then return to their countries of origin. When 
speaking of returnees, the present study only refers to former FTFs. Globally, terrorism 
returnees have now become a major source of concern, more so with the possibility that upon 
their return, these trained individuals can perpetuate attacks or other forms of harm in their 
home countries (Styszynski, 2015; Koehler 2015). A 2016 report by the International Centre 
for Counter-Terrorism puts the number of foreign fighters from the European Union at 
between 3,922 and 4,294, a majority of whom come from Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. Of these, 30 % returned home (Boutin, Chauzal, Dorsey, Jegerings, 
Paulussen, Pohl, Reed & Zavagli, 2016). With thousands of FTFs travelling back home, 
countries must develop successful reintegration programmes as a way of preventing 
recidivism among returnees and also to mitigate the risk of further radicalization. Such 
programmes can also help to build overall community-level resilience to violent extremism 
(Holmer & Shtuni, 2017).  
Similar to many other countries, Kenya is facing the challenge of managing the return 
of its citizens who fought with Al-Shabaab or who joined the group to act in different 
capacities. Cragin (2019) notes that Kenya is a significant contributor to foreign fighters, not 
just to Al-Shabaab but also to the Islamic State, with about 100 fighters from Kenya having 
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least 70 of them remains unknown (Cragin, 2019). Thousands of others have joined Al-
Shabaab in Somalia and at some point, made their way back home. As Horgan and Braddock 
(2010) note, many open questions exist, for example, the returnees’ place in society, their 
prospects of reintegration, as well as acceptance from the host communities: “Where will they 
go? Who will monitor them? Will they re-offend? Can they be turned away from terrorism 
while in prison? Will any recidivism rate prove acceptable to the public? (p. 268).”   
In Kenya, efforts have been made to facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration. This 
study investigates how communities in the coastal region of Mombasa and Kwale perceive the 
reintegration of these returnees. Many other states like Somalia, Afghanistan, Belgium and the 
Netherlands already run various reintegration programmes with different outcomes. Most 
studies focusing on these programmes are usually descriptive accounts of the programmes or 
theoretical (Koehler, 2016). Grossman and Barolsky (2019) observe that significant gaps in 
knowledge about the role of communities in countering violent extremism (CVE) exist, even 
more so regarding the role of communities and ways to empower them in CVE efforts. More 
attention has been directed towards literature that largely focuses on the role of the 
community in preventing violent extremism. Equally, paying less attention on engagement 
with those who have “previously been radicalized to violence or otherwise exposed to violent 
radicalized beliefs, influences and settings” (p. 21). Hence, there is a gap in literature on the 
rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorists, especially on the premise of the role of 
communities and their experiences. The following study aims to address that gap in the 
literature. 
Countering violent extremism (CVE) has become a ‘catchphrase’ applied in the 
context of preventing terrorist threats. Even though there is yet to be consensus on what the 
term entails, a more practical view refers to it as a set of non-coercive measures to prevent 
terrorism (Ambrozik, 2019; Williams, 2017). CVE involves, among other activities, counter-
radicalization methods. CVE is a field of policy practice as opposed to an academic study. 
The CVE field emerged in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the 
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approaches to respond to the threat by terrorism, an emerging CVE discourse altered these 
approaches. CVE remains critical of the use of force in dealing with terrorism. It calls for the 
use of softer and non-coercive responses to prevent the rise of terrorism in the first place 
(Harris-Hogan et al., 2016). CVE is, thus; a departure from counter-terrorism approaches that 
engage in military means to deal with an ever-changing security landscape (Mogire & Mkutu, 
2011).  
The United Nations (2014) defines reintegration as “the process by which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. 
Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily 
taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a 
country and national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance” 
(p.25). There are varying definitions of what the term radicalization actually includes. Bennett 
(2019) defines it as “a process through which an individual comes to accept a worldview that 
is contrary to mainstream thought and may support the use of violence to realize his or her 
ideas” (p. 48). The concept of violent extremism is applied in this study to mean “advocating, 
engaging or supporting ideologically motivated violence to further socio, economic or 
political goals” (Romaniuk et al., 2018: 162). Reintegration, therefore, denotes the 
“assimilation of former combatants into communities” (Alexander, 2012:48). This involves 
the “establishment of social, familial, and communities’ ties and positive participation in 
society” (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017:402). The establishment of reintegration programmes is 
critical to prevent recidivism of returnees, but also for reducing the threats of youth 





A case study approach was employed to analyze how communities perceive returnees’ 
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of a complex and bounded case(s), in its context, with the analysis undertaken seeking to be 
holistic. The case study method is a recognized tool for researchers to gather qualitative 
information (Breslin & Buchanaan, 2008). This includes information that is highly descriptive 
because it is grounded in deep and varied sources (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). Mombasa 
and Kwale Counties were chosen for being among the hotspot Counties for radicalization and 
violent extremism in Kenya. Together with Lamu County, they were the first Counties to 
launch “County Action Plans on Violent Extremism” (Mombasa County, 2018). 
 
Participants 
A mixed methods exploration was undertaken in the two areas of Mombasa and 
Kwale, Kenya, between June and August 2020. Thirty-one in-depth and semi-structured 
interviews were conducted, two of which with returnees and the rest with key informants, 
stakeholders, and actors involved in reintegration initiatives. The sample included civil 
society actors (CS), professors as part of the academic community (P), journalists (J), police 
officers (PO), key informants (KI), government officials (GO), religious leaders (RL) and 
village elders (VA). Data from the community was collected using an online questionnaire. A 
total of 104 responses were received from both Kwale and Mombasa Counties.  
An interview guide was prepared for all interviews which, except for two, were 
conducted in English. Those two interviews were done in Swahili and translated into English. 
The data collected from the interviews was first processed by transcribing the interviews.  
Qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis was used to analyse the data and organize 
it into categories and themes based on the questions the study sought to answer. Data from 
questionnaires submitted through Survey Monkey was analyzed and presented as tables, 
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Ethical Considerations 
 
The research team outlined and explained the study objectives to the participants. To ensure 
anonymity, all interviewees are only referred to by professional category and numerical 
identifiers. The purpose of the study was reiterated to all interviewees throughout the study, to 
ensure an informed decision about their study participation. Each participant gave consent to 
take part. To further ensure safety and confidentiality in this research, no names were listed in 
the research notes or reports and there was no videotaping of any interview. Hard and soft 
copies of interview notes and questionnaires were securely kept and only available to those 
directly involved in the research. Engagement with national and local government, law 
enforcement, and civil society organizations was sought throughout the research to ensure 
minimization of risks for the interviewees. Research permission was secured from the 
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation (NACOSTI) and was accorded 
under permit number 329110. Similarly, a review by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
United States International University in Nairobi was sought, and permission was granted to 
proceed with the research.   
 
Literature Review  
 
In response to evolving terrorist tactics, recognition is growing that hard, security-based 
approaches alone will not effectively address terrorism challenges. Scholars such as 
Gunaratna (2013) and Holmer and Shtuni (2017) note that fighting terrorism using kinetic and 
lethal methods, based on interventions by intelligence services, use of military force and law 
enforcement, has proved to be an inefficient approach, since it cannot stem the spread of 
ideological extremism, which is the foundation of terrorism. Community-based policy 
programmes for countering violent extremism (CVE programmes) have now become a core 
component of national counter-terrorism strategies aiming to counter the spread of extremist 
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specific initiatives, ranging from education projects and community policing strategies to 
targeted interventions for individuals at risk of radicalization, and building overall 
community-level resilience to violent extremism.  
Most of the literature on reintegration in Africa focuses on ex-offender rehabilitation 
and reintegration after release from prison. Even in these settings, it is widely acknowledged 
by scholars in CVE that ex-offenders struggle to adjust when they return to their former 
communities. Other factors that complicate their reintegration include broken family and 
community relationships, unemployment, and lack of after-care services, among others 
(Chikadzi, 2017). Some African countries, for instance, Somalia have developed programmes 
to handle disengaged combatants. Gelot and Hansen (2019) discuss the “National Programme 
for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants and Youth at Risk in Somalia” 
which was launched in 2012 to “provide support to low-risk disengaged Al-Shabaab 
combatants [and] to reintegrate them back into the community” (p. 569). Additionally,  in 
partnership with actors such as the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and support from 
governments such as Denmark and Norway set up at least four facilities. Khalil, Brown, 
Chant, Olowo, and Wood (2019) analyze the experiences of former combatants in one of the 
rehabilitation centres in Somalia (Serendi Rehabilitation Centre). Similarly, they emphasize 
the importance of establishing and maintaining familial and communal ties from the 
beginning of the rehabilitation process. Regarding community perceptions of reintegration, 
their report observes that these can be highly diverse, ranging from acceptance to extreme 
ostracization, depending on whether a community, clan or family’s experience with Al-
Shabaab has been negative or positive. 
UNSOM itself published a report in 2016 entitled “Voices of Al-Shabaab: 
Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center”. The mission looks 
at key pillars for a comprehensive approach to counter Al-Shabaab and recommends the 
inclusion of family members and clan leaders of those affected in the communication strategy 
for the reintegration narrative. Ehiane (2019) weighs in with a look at the Nigerian experience 
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(NACTEST), a policy framework that aims to de-radicalize extremist groups, rehabilitate, 
reintegrate, and finally disengage the groups from violence, Ehiane contends  that there is too 
much emphasis on military actions, as well as ending support to militant ideologies. More 
importantly, there is least focus on the social context the former combatants might reintegrate 
into as well as  the communities’ perceptions.  
While some literature on the role of communities in reintegration processes in Africa 
exists, most of it approaches this subject from the point of view of the returnees/ex-
combatants and their experiences trying to reintegrate. Less exploration is done regarding the 
communities’ perspectives hosting these returnees, their involvement in, and perceptions of, 
the reintegration programmes. This is surprising since the positive support and active 
participation of communities logically are key to the success of reintegration and 
rehabilitation.   
 
A Brief History: Returnees’ Spread in Kenya’s Kwale and Mombasa Counties 
 
Kwale and Mombasa Counties have been hotspots for terrorism and radicalization. Mkutu and 
Opondo (2019) observe that in these two counties, branches of groups exist that believe in the 
necessity of establishing a caliphate, for example Hizb ut-Tahrir, as well as several mosques 
influenced by radical teachings. Further, extremist groups use cover agencies that send young 
people to countries, for instance, Yemen and Syria under the disguise of providing 
employment. Since Kenya announced an amnesty programme for Al-Shabaab returnees from 
Somalia in 2015, many young men admitted to having been members of the group and 
surrendered to the authorities (Ombati, 2020). Cragin (2019) estimates that there are at least 
20 former ISIS fighters who have returned to Kenya and have not been incarcerated. Mkutu 
and Opondo (2019) note that for Kwale alone, “the estimates of returnee FTFs vary from 300 
to 1000” (p.13). In their socio-economic and demographic survey of Kenyan returnees 
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Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated a total population of about 700 returnees spread 
in the coastal counties of Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa (IOM, 2015). 
 
How Al-Shabaab Returnees in Kenya’s Mombasa and Kwale are Reintegrated 
 
Kenya’s reintegration experience is novel. It began specifically in 2015 with the 
announcement of an amnesty programme. In 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta launched the 
National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) which included prevention and 
counter-radicalization to the more traditional counter-terrorism approaches already in place. 
This strategy assigns roles to various government agencies, county governments, civil society 
organizations and communities. Before the NSCVE strategy, measures against violent 
extremism were security-focused and anchored on the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012; the 
Security Laws (Amendment), Act, 2014; the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering 
(Amendment) Act, 2017 (Ogada, 2017; Mogire & Mkutu, 2011). These laws address violent 
extremism by policing, intelligence gathering, and prosecution. The Strategy came in to 
complement them and look at the softer approaches and means of reducing communities’ 
vulnerability to violent extremism. The Kenyan government, like others globally, realizes that 
hard power alone cannot address this threat.  
New interventions are continuously focusing on community engagement to build 
improved relations with citizens, which aids in the gathering of terror-related information by 
the police, identification of violent extremists and curtailing radicalization (Cherney & 
Hartley, 2017). Kenya’s comprehensive strategy derives from the country’s strong perception 
of terrorism threats. Securitising terrorism is an existential threat that requires extraordinary 
interventions to address it. Interestingly, this is a war of allies and foes, with those fighting 
against it perceived as allies and those against as foes. This came out strongly in President 
Uhuru Kenyatta’s speech, as he launched the 2016 NSCVE, where he encouraged a united 
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agencies, multilateral institutions, and the overwhelming bulk of civil society stand against 
them. In every continent, armies and police forces are fighting them (p.1)”. 
The Kenya Government mandated Counties to develop County Action Plans (CAPs) 
to support the national CVE efforts at the local level. Kwale County was the first to develop a 
CVE plan. The Director of Kenya’s National Counter Terrorism Centre and Special Envoy on 
CVE, Ambassador Martin Kimani, launched the Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent 
Extremism in February 2017, a document that discusses countering violent extremism through 
prevention and restorative efforts (Shauri, 2017). Mombasa County governor Hassan Joho 
launched Mombasa’s Action Plan shortly after the Kwale one. The Action Plan is based on 
the nine pillars of the NSCVE, which are training and capacity building, education, 
psychosocial, security, media and online, arts and culture, faith-based and ideological, legal 
and policy and political, with an additional two pillars on women and the economy (Mombasa 
County, 2017). Both plans recognize the crucial role that a successful reintegration 
programme can play in the countering violent extremism arena.  
GO1, a senior government official looks at rehabilitation and reintegration as “curative 
efforts” of dealing with returnees:  
 
“At the rehabilitation stage, a returnee is not fit to join the society, and the aim is to 
give counselling and psychosocial skills and impart critical reasoning skills too. It is a 
stage whose aim is to cure. Reintegration only happens at the point where you are sure 
this person (the returnee) is not a threat to the social being of the community you are 
releasing him into. And here the workload is both on the individual and the society, 
and monitoring has to continue to evaluate progress” (GO1). 
 
 
GO1 further notes that ‘disengagement’, which Horgan (2009) loosely describes as ‘leaving’ a 
terror group precedes reintegration. Bell (2015) views disengagement as a process that 
focuses on purely behavioural changes, such as ceasing violent behaviour and supporting 
terrorism materially. Rather than resulting in a psychological shift and abandoning extremist 
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differs from deradicalization, which is change or reduction in ideological support or extremist 
beliefs (Horgan, 2009; Reinares, 2011).  
Both the Kwale and the Mombasa Counties action plans include aspects of local 
reintegration initiatives for returning FTFs. Under the psychosocial pillar, the Mombasa 
County plan notes that there are limited systematic communal psychosocial support measures 
of dealing with returnees. The Mombasa County plan emphasizes stigma reduction for 
terrorism victims. The Kwale County plan is broken into several stages of intervention that 
include the disengagement, reintegration, and rehabilitation stages of handling returnees. 
Emphasis is placed on interventions that are geared towards helping individuals rethink their 
ideas and renounce support for violence, provision of cult-departing counselling and therapy, 
and establishing a sense of normalcy within the community and harmony with social norms. 
 In Mombasa and Kwale Counties, it is vastly acknowledged that radicalization is a 
growing security threat. A cross-section of residents are aware of who is a returning foreign 
fighter from Al-Shabaab, some of them being defectors. One question in the online survey 
sought the respondents’ knowledge of people who had joined the Al-Shabaab in Somalia. As 
illustrated in Figure 1 below, 3 out of every 10 respondents (28.16 %) showed that they knew 
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Figure 1. Knowledge of anyone who went to Somalia to join the Al-Shabaab then returned. 
 
 According to most of the key respondents interviewed, it is not a surprise that the 
community is aware of who the returnees are, even when the security and government agents 
have no records of these people. A senior police officer in Kwale noted that the community in 
most cases will not report returnees, so that “it protects their own”. The officer attributed this 
‘protection’ to the mistrust between the police and communities.  
 
“Those who come back are in the community [returnees]. We know they are there, but 
we do not know who they are. Because the general feeling in the communities is [that] 
as long as the returnee is minding his own business, then there is no problem. If he 
conducts an attack, as long as it is not being done in their area, then they have no 
problem and will thus not say a word. People who were born and raised there will 
rarely tell you anything. Any little information we get is mostly from those who have 
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The lack of trust between the state and the community has resulted from the previous 
repressive policing tactics such as arbitrary arrests and use of excessive force, among other 
negative practices. Scholars like Omeje and Githigaro (2012) note that this has been 
conceptualized as having an earlier focus historically on regime policing as opposed to citizen 
policing. In counter-terrorism policing, similar repressive tactics have further undermined the 
police–community relations because of the flouting of domestic law (Prestholdt, 2011). 
Majority of the Kenya population are of the view that the Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit 
(ATPU) commit varied human rights violations in the pretext of counter-terrorism (Githigaro, 
2020). 
 
Community Perceptions of Returnees’ Reintegration 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine community perceptions of returnees’ 
reintegration. One question in the online questionnaire sought respondents’ views on 
reintegration of the FTFs returnees into communities. As shown in figure 2 below, a majority 
of the respondents who filled the online questionnaire (76.24 %) agreed to the returnees’ 
reintegration  into society. This shows that the community supports integration, even though 
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Figure 2: Should those who return from Somalia be reintegrated into society? 
 
 While the community supports returnees’ reintegration, most respondents (69.90 %) 
admitted gaps in programmes that could support them to take part in their reintegration. This 
is critical since, as discussed above, community involvement and participation are key in the 
reintegration process. When they come back, returnees have to exist within a community, 
whether it is their original home or a new one, and acceptance by the community, as some key 
informants observed, is key for their reintegration. Figure 3 below shows that 7 out of 10 
participants were not aware of any programmes they could depend on to help them understand 
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Figure 3: Are there any programmes put in place to help you learn how to help returnees to 
reintegrate into the community? 
 
 This again points to the lack of community participation, which, as discussed, is key in 
reintegration. Scholars agree that community engagement is beneficial to both the community 
and the lawmakers and enforcers who can leverage this to target their outreach efforts on key 
community organizations. It can also help break down stereotypes and prejudices that the 
police and minority groups have towards each other, eventually building the much-needed 
trust between stakeholders (Cherney & Hartley, 2017). 
 
Perceptions of Secrecy and Government Mistrust 
 
On a broader scale, the Kenya government maintains strict control over processes related to 
the reintegration of Al-Shabaab returnees. There is secrecy and mistrust around how returnees 
are handled by the government and helped to ease back into the societies. As shown in the 






Juma & Githigaro: Communities’ Perceptions of Reintegration of Al-Shabaab Returnees in 








ISSN: 2363-9849          
understanding, if at all, of the reintegration processes and programmes. The communities, 
especially in Kwale County, rarely give information to government agencies about returnees 
who quietly ease back into the community. PO2, a police officer in Mombasa acknowledges 
that the community does not trust the system because often, the burden of proof is placed on 
community members who volunteer information. Civil society actors overwhelmingly voiced 
their concern on individuals that volunteer information to government agents being treated as 
suspects and being put under surveillance (CS2, CS3). “Communities know that not all 
government agents are loyal. Some are in the terror networks and give out information to the 
militants and militant groups” (CS1). PO3, a senior police officer in the coastal region agrees 
with these sentiments: 
   
“In every market, there is a mad man and there are those few cops [police officers] that 
do not respect confidentiality. We have them here and we need to work on them. 
Someone comes to report that the son of so and so has come back after disappearing 
for a year, or several months, and just before the one who has volunteered the 




The government is also accused by communities of using communal punishment 
where security officers target and harass entire villages when word goes about in the 
community that a returnee is among them. “They come and are sometimes very violent, 
breaking down doors and beating up women and children. A few weeks ago, they killed a 
returnee and his two children, and also his pregnant wife,” VA2, a village elder from Kwale 
claimed. The researchers could not independently ascertain this claim. But PO1 and PO2 
share that, the communities in numerous times become extremely difficult to work with. They 
narrate just how difficult it is to get information from the community, especially in Kwale 
County, which PO3 describes as a “much-closed society” and view the police as villains. The 
terror networks eliminate anyone seen to be collaborating with the police on CVE matters or 
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“I have often gone to a scene of crime, where the people openly saw the perpetrator 
and may have seen details like the number plate of the motorcycle the perpetrator was 
using, say, when he gunned down someone. But everyone will tell you they saw 
nothing and adamantly refuse to give any information” (PO3). 
 
These narratives explain the distance between the police and the policed. With low 
trust levels, debates on security assurance, witness protection, and confidentiality are 
prominent. CS2 notes that with the amnesty programme, many returnees came back into the 
society, but in what he terms a “very non-procedural and haphazard manner.” 
 
“You need to involve all the people in the reintegration process. These include the 
people in the village where these men and women are returning to. Here, we just wake 
up one day and we see the government agencies have allowed so and so to come back 
home. And the people are asking themselves, ‘how do we relate to them? How do we 
handle them? What do we do when we spot fishy behaviour? Should we talk to them 
or associate us with their activities…?’ It becomes very difficult for the entire village” 
(CS2). 
 
Civil society organizations (CSOs) and community-based actors (CBAs) interviewed 
for this study also note that there is a lot of mistrust between them and the government, yet 
they are the people closest to the communities. They, for example, cannot provide detailed 
information on how returnee rehabilitation and reintegration happen since they may not 
interact directly with or reach out to returnees, and only government agencies and officials 
can do that. Civil society organizations which had programmes to help the returnees were at 
some point labelled as terrorist sympathizers by the government.  
 
“The National Counter-Terrorism Centre treats the rehabilitation processes as top 
secret and would never share the nitty-gritty of those processes. I know so many 
people who are in hiding and will not come out because they are asking, ‘if I am to 
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Despite being heavily involved in the development of county action plans on 
countering violent extremism, CSOs like Haki Africa have stopped handling returnees 
because of suspicion by the government (Lwanga & Atieno, 2018). 
 
Reintegration as Something ‘Imposed’ on the Communities 
 
Local interviewees perceive that reintegration in Mombasa and Kwale feels like “a 
government-built and pushed programme that cares less about the thoughts and needs of the 
local communities” (CS1). All the civil society actors interviewed observe that communities 
are not prepared, educated and involved in the processes of reintegration from the onset and 
that the approaches are top-down, without involving the host communities.  
 
“The government comes up with regulations and outlines of things to do, then hands 
that over to people from outside the region to come and implement here. What we do 
then is we are working blindly and not focusing on ensuring constructive engagement 
with the community. Security agents are looking at reintegration as purely a security 
issue and thus push other actors away, including the same communities that provide a 
home to the returnees” (CS3). 
 
 
KI3, a PhD student, notes that it rarely works that way and the “importation of 
bureaucrats to lead the implementation of projects is the reason many government projects, 
not only on reintegration, fail.” KI1, a seasoned researcher, supports the communities’ views 
on the feelings of exclusion. Equally, there is the tendency of government to use community 
members merely as tools for collecting intelligence. The Muslim communities in Mombasa 
and Kwale Counties suffer most from the police surveillance, informal questioning and the 
suspicion of intelligence gathering by the government. Muslims, especially, also experience 
publicized raids and arrests that lead to anxiety, withdrawal, and the unwillingness of the 
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“The government must realise the importance of using local leaders and the chaplaincy 
at the grassroots level. To deal with terrorism, you must realize the very strong social 
context, and must thus have an interface between government and community. And 
that interface is through these local elders at the grassroots level. You cannot bomb 
down an ideology; you need conversations with those affected” (KI1). 
 
 
Issa and Machikou (2019) explain the importance of cooperation between county and 
national governments, local organizations and the traditional authorities, including the village 
elders, and community elders. The duo points out the importance of having local mechanisms 
to organize reintegration and reconciliation efforts, since various aspects of community life 
rely on the blessing of the traditional elders’ authority. CS6 testifies:  
 
“The engagement we see between the government and the rest of us, — the 
community-based organizations and other groups at the grassroots — is very 
superficial, with no genuine opportunity for engagement. There is no consultation, 
really, and people at the lower level cannot influence an outcome” (CS6). 
 
When the grassroots authorities and the national agencies speak the same language, 
communities are most able to reintegrate returnees in a standardized manner (Issa & 
Machikou, 2019). 
 
Returnees as ‘Potential Security Threats’ 
 
While most community members interviewed as part of this study agreed that reintegration 
was necessary for returnees, findings also pointed out that stigma existed towards the 
returnees and their families. According to J1, J4 and J5, all who interviewed at least four Al-
Shabaab returnees each, the hardest part for returnees when they come back is dealing with 
stigma and community acceptance. In addition, their families reject them.  J1, J5 and J6, all 
seasoned journalists, on issues of terrorism and security note that all returnees they have 
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“These people are in most cases viewed as outcasts, especially, when they go back to a 
community where someone suffered directly as a result of a terror activity, for 
example, losing a loved one in a terror attack, or even property. The community shuns 
them as killers, even if they did not carry out an attack” (J6). 
 
 
There is the fear that some returnees may not have fully reformed and are out to harm. 
Another fear is that they may expose communities to extra surveillance since government 
agents may monitor them. The stigma extends to their immediate families, and it becomes 
very hard for them to coexist with other members of society. JI who has interviewed dozens 
of returnees asserts: 
 
“Most of them then come back and decide to start a new life elsewhere, away from 
their original settings because they cannot take part in social activities, or even get 
employment. I have met some returnees who used to live in Kwale but now live in 




Knowing how crucial acceptance is for those who are remorseful, VA1 and VA2, both 
village elders in their areas, emphasis this view in the regular village gatherings, youth group 
meetings and other forums where they address the issues of radicalization. 
 
“With the right support and organization, and people not fearing or running away from 
them, the returnees can do very well. I have seen some who have come back, settled, 
and even married from the community, and now they are taking care of their families. 
It, however, came with a lot of organization with the immediate members of the family 
and the surrounding communities” (RL1). 
 
 
Stigma also arises because there are no efforts towards encouraging reconciliation 
between the returnees and the communities they are going back to. This, CS3 notes, is very 
important, especially in settings where a member of the community feels aggrieved or 
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(2019) argues that reconciliation is a vital process in reintegration and the only way 
coexistence can be achieved. More importantly, she proposes that in contexts where stigma 
remains a significant challenge, there should be an option for the returnee to hold off 
revealing their identity for some time, to allow more interaction with community members 
and increase participation in community programmes, without the restrictions brought about 
by stigma. The assurance of anonymity will ensure the protection of the returnee from stigma 
or harm especially where reintegration takes place away from the original homes or villages 




The terms and concepts used to discuss terrorism and counter-terrorism, can have intense 
implications on how communities and individuals behave and react to events and other people 
(Appleby, 2010).  In Kenya, discourses in newspapers, public gatherings, social circles, and 
by newsmakers, journalists, and communities at large refer to returnees from Somalia after 
joining the Al-Shabaab as “terrorists” and/or extremists. Additionally, in reference to such 
persons, Swahili terms such as “magaidi”, meaning ‘extremists or terrorists’ and “itikadi kali” 
meaning ‘radicalized’ are used leading to negative labelling. This includes even those that 
claim they were ill-informed, did not take part in terror-linked activities, and returned home 
because they did not subscribe to the ideals of the extremist group. R1 says: 
 
“They have nicknamed me “Wa Shababu” (A person of the Al-Shabaab). They do not 
call me that to my face, but that is the term used to refer to me when talking about me 
or anything related to me with other people. For example, my house is right next to the 
road, so you will hear someone tell a motorcycle operator, ‘I want to alight near the 
Shababu’s house.’ Just the fact that I went to Somalia makes me an Al-Shabaab in 
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At the community level, Barrinha (2010) notes that the label “terrorist” creates more 
than a rebel movement. It forms the notion of the ‘other’ and ‘us versus them’, whereby the 
‘us’ looks at the ‘other’ as inferior and as damaging to state stability. This discourse, Barrinha 
asserts, is the kind that tries to create barriers between communities or groups in the same 
locale. The main issue is that there is no definition of the extent to which the terrorist label 
could apply. For returnees, the act of leaving their country to join a militant group is 
“terrorism”. It is important to skillfully craft counter-terrorism strategies to avoid further 
exacerbating the problem (Appleby, 2010). 
For the phrase “foreign fighting”, Sexton (2017) notes that one of the major challenges 
today is that there is no agreed-upon definition of the phrase, and this largely makes 
understanding the problem an issue. It also creates inconsistencies in determining who 
qualifies as a terrorist fighter. Similar to the definitions of the term “terrorist”, most 
definitions of a foreign terrorist fighter, including the widely acknowledged definition by the 
United Nations Security Council (2014), pose some questions as they emphasise religious 
motivation, travel for fighting and travel for training. Sexton states, “There is something of a 
paradox inherent in labelling these individuals ‘foreign’ because while they participate in 
conflicts in other countries, they pose a (perceived) risk in their ‘home’ State” (p.35). 
 
Perceptions of Returnees as Crime Perpetrators 
 
The community in most part does not trust that the returnees can change, and members 
continuously doubt their actions, even though they may be well-intended. R2 maintains that 
for any petty crime in his locale, he in most cases is always the first suspect. “When a crime 
happens in the locale, the returnees are always the first suspects (VA1), and they have to 
always live in fear, constantly looking over their shoulders (J1; J2; J4; KI2; CS2; CS4).  
 
“They do come and ask, ‘I lost my motorbike, have you seen it?’, or ‘X’s shop was 
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their eyes. And it is the same with the police too. Sometimes I wish I had just come 
back silently and not told anyone” (R2). 
 
 
Scholars like P2, a professor of Security studies, avows that the fear usually stems 
from unavailable communication channels such as radio programmes and community 
meetings where returnees, groups opposing returnee reintegration and community members 
can express their feelings and fears. Kaplan and Nussio (2012) theorize that well organised 
communities create an environment where ex-offenders experience less fear and greater and 
better support.  Organized communities provide opportunities for these people to take part in 
communal activity and organization, mitigating any security dilemmas, if at all, and 
protecting them from remaining in or joining armed groups. In contrast, in communities 
where less social participation is present, there are higher levels of organization among ex-
offenders themselves. P1, a professor with expertise in violent extremism claims:  
 
“It is at this point that you witness a surge in cases of organized crime because these 
people [returnees] need social contact. They have an individual agency to seek 
organization, and they seek these whenever the opportunity presents itself. They need 
to survive too, and the way they are doing it is by forming gangs” (P1). 
 
 
In Mombasa, some gang members shot dead during robbery incidents were  returnees. 
Security officers claimed that most of them target business owners and rob them of their 
money (Ahmed, 2019). Other ways to survive are through drugs trade and, some of them also 
act as sleeper cells. (GO2; GO3) 
 
When Reintegration Happens in Communities with Existing Unmet Needs 
 
Our findings point out the fact that the state and capability of a community in which a 
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members of that community and also on whether it has robust social structures that relate to 
them.  
 
“We should ask ourselves about the quality of the communities receiving these 
returnees. Is it their internal strife? joblessness? poverty? Because you find that these 
are the things that most probably made these returning FTFs leave. When returnees 
come to such societies and receive economic assistance, community resentment may 
set in as returnees are perceived as being favoured or singled out for assistance, while 
others are denied assistance” (KI1). 
 
 
Gunaratna (2013) talks about tailoring programmes to suit local conditions. He points 
out that as long as there is a glaring divide between the socio-economic status of groups in the 
same community, and an environment where the fundamental social and economic grievances 
are overlooked, conflict will always arise. Reintegration programmes will face resistance 
because of discounting the core motivations to join terrorist groups.   During the field research 
for this study, the most commonly cited reasons for why people joined the Al-Shabaab 
included unemployment, poverty and unfair treatment by the government. A section of study 
participants (60 %) from the expert interviews made connections between poverty and joining 
Al-Shabaab. This links closely to unemployment but also related to other issues in the coastal 
region such as landlessness and lack of economic opportunities. This notwithstanding the 
contested relationships between poverty and terrorism (Piazza, 2006, 2011). 
Reports of negative stereotypes, discriminatory policies, and unfair targeting by 
government agents towards Muslims are rampant in coastal Kenya. Muslim religious leaders 
interviewed in this study noted that for a while now, profiling of young men in their mosques 
has been happening and they are put under intense scrutiny by government agents. Security 
agents accuse some of the youth of sympathising with the Al-Shabaab even when they do not. 
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“Some of these people in government do not realize that even non-Muslims are being 
radicalized. They believe that radicalization only happens to boys in the mosque. They 
harass them, and their families and demand answers where there are none. We have 
had cases of young men being trailed by people, being arrested without charge, then 
later released, and some even tortured. It is traumatic” (RL1). 
 
 
In response to terror attacks, sometimes security forces in Kenya have employed a 
dragnet approach to identify the terror suspects, leading to the arrest of hundreds of people at 
a go. One such incident happened in September 2003, when police arrested over 800 people in 
Mombasa, with many of those targeted in the arrests being Muslims, particularly ethnic 
Somalis and Arabs (Botha, 2013). 
Badurdeen and Goldsmith (2018) note that such factors can make young Muslims feel 
they do not belong and cannot integrate into their society. They feel disrespected and 
unwanted by the government. Extremist organizations such as the Al-Shabaab feel the need 
for recognition by giving them roles and key positions within the organization, creating that 
sense of belonging and self-worth. Speckhard and Shajkovci (2019) note that “an unknown 
percentage of Muslims in Kenya feel they are not treated fairly by security forces, or that they 
do not belong in Kenya” (p. 16). GO2 is also a researcher who has done extensive work on 
terrorism issues in coastal Kenya. He concurs that socio-economic circumstances is what the 
terror groups leverage when they table their offers for recruitment. 
 
“When the Al-Shabaab come calling, they look at these push-and-pull factors which 
make people unsettled. These are things like lack of jobs, a search for an identity, 
political and economic marginalization and land issues. Then they give offers that give 
a reprieve to these young people. They promise them jobs, they promise to take care of 
their families and give them a life where there is no inequality and discrimination” 
(GO2).   
 
 
The Al-Shabaab has been quite adept at making use of the victim narrative in its 
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discrimination, especially in the coastal areas of Mombasa, Kwale, and Lamu Island 
(Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2019). Badurdeen and Goldsmith (2018) agree with these 
sentiments, noting that the youth in these areas have unmet needs and failure to address these 
needs provides a conducive environment for extremist organizations to step in to satisfy these 
unmet needs. Ndzovu (2018) specifically speaks of unmet needs of Muslims in Kenya, 
including lacking access to educational opportunities and jobs, and how this if not addressed, 
could be an avenue for jihadi clerics to capitalise on the dissatisfaction and use the desperate 
Muslims for their intolerant agenda. Jihadi clerics use Islam as their political ideology. They 
direct provocative sermons and statements against the state, Christians and anti-jihad Muslim 
clerics. The infamous Sheikh Aboud Rogo was one of them.  
Reintegration programmes thus need to examine conditions and dynamics that fuel 
radicalization, to work on reforming the criminal justice sector, and to build both social and 
political resilience to the influence of violent extremism. This is important because many 
times, the individual is often returning to the social networks in which his or her radicalization 
took place (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). 
Where rehabilitation and reintegration programmes involve the offering of incentives 
such as financial help or reduced prison sentences, Nzomo, Kagwanja, Muna, Maluki, and 
Kagiri, (2017) whose work focuses on the reintegration experiences in Kenya and 
strengthening community resilience against radicalization, propose that governments use such 
incentives sparingly and only where other feasible alternatives are lacking. This would reduce 
backlash from the community members who may feel that the criminals are being rewarded. 
This is an issue faced by other reintegration programmes, including in Nigeria where Clubb 
and Tapley (2018) note that the pressure to prioritize the resettlement the millions of people 
displaced by the conflict constantly frustrates reintegration efforts for former Boko Haram 
combatants.  
There is a lot of community push-back against reintegration and questions why the 
government prioritizes support to those who left to join extremist groups. While the state or 
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that create grievances and hinder their ability to prosper, including poverty, and the paucity of 




Findings of this research, and from scholarly material focussing on CVE shows that the return 
of FTFs can create real or perceived problems within communities. Clubb, Barnes, O’Connor, 
Schewe and Davies (2019) debate public attitudes to the reintegration of terrorists, noting the 
need to carry out more research in order to explore attitudes to reintegration programmes, be 
it in counter-terrorism or Peace and Conflict studies. They argue that community 
acquiescence and support towards reintegration programmes play a big role in determining 
the rates of recidivism. This study has made substantial steps towards generating knowledge 
on perceptions of reintegration programmes. It discusses the experience of reintegration in 
Mombasa and Kwale Counties in Kenya, outlining the importance of a holistic community 
engagement effort in reintegration.  
The findings herein do not depart from existing literature on the same issues. 
Gunaratna (2015) emphasizes the importance of upstream intervention, where the community 
is engaged by the government and government realizes the associated value. The key benefit 
according to Gunaratna is that it principally reduces the rates of radicalization of other 
members, and ultimately, the community becomes “the eyes and the ears of the state” (p.7). 
This is due to the fact that through joint involvement with state agencies, there is the 
realization of the common good and trust building.  
Findings in this study show that communities in Kwale and Mombasa Counties have 
not actively participated in the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees. Most members of 
the community look at returnees suspiciously. While most of the members agree that 
reintegration is key, they do not know how or what their role is, in facilitating a smooth 
reintegration programme. This plays a part in how these same communities perceive 
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reintegration, then the returnees remain isolated. Koehler (2017) stresses the role that family 
and friends play in enabling reform and abandonment of destructive and dangerous behaviour. 
Through counselling programmes that target the family as a unit and any other concerned 
persons, Koehler observes that positive, pro-social relations are born that can help avert 
danger as long as families are not an intelligence-gathering tool.  
Both governmental and non-governmental actors play a key role in drafting CVE 
strategies. This is the case in community policing an initiative that has played a key role in 
eliminating mistrust and addressing local needs. Poor relations between the police and 
communities in Kenya exhibit not only in the field of VE. The Kenya Police is criticized for 
use of excessive force, impunity, and a general disregard for democratic ideals and citizen 
rights (CHRIPS & APCOF, 2014). Police shootings of suspects, even when they have 
surrendered, and use of excessive force against protestors have all become synonymous with 
the Kenya Police conduct over the years. “The problem of impunity and lack of accountability 
in policing became even more clear during the post-election violence of 2007–2008” (p.12).   
Diphoorn and Stapele (2020) note that security strategies like community policing are 
less effective because of the lack of trust between police and citizens. The police can extract 
information and assert control within a State-centric narrative and framework. The 
assumption among government and security agents is that community policing is a “softer” 
way of dealing with crime that moves away from traditional law enforcement practices. But 
that is not the case, and as Mulugeta and Mekuriaw (2017) argue, it is, in fact, tougher on 
crime because members are most times privy to some information that the police may not 
have, and if trusted enough with this information, then the police can respond more 
effectively.  
Communities ultimately play a critical role in reintegration. The research findings 
show that how involved a community is, and how receptive members are to returnees is key in 
determining the success of a reintegration programme. Community acceptance is vital for the 
well-being of returnees and their interaction within the community. Without a supportive 
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recidivism. Communities, if properly supported and involved in the processes, can be a source 
of encouragement and emotional support, encouraging the returnees to comply with 
supervision conditions, and avoid criminal activities. They are an essential part of the strategy 
to prevent recidivism. 
It is key that in these processes of rehabilitation and integration, building of resilient 
communities is a priority in order to protect both the community and the reintegrated 
individual from relapsing into violence (Hettiarachchi, 2018). It is important to note that the 
community and family of the returnee experience the reintegration process together with the 
returnee. How communities are structured, and how they interact, varies. Therefore, Holmer 
and Shtuni (2017) note that a single model of rehabilitation and reintegration cannot be 
applied across cultural contexts. For programmes to have greater impact and greater 
legitimacy, they must be informed by a local understanding of social norms, community 




Recommendation 1: Eliminate mistrust by providing host communities with timely, accurate, 
and unbiased information on issues about the reintegration of returnees. Also, it is important 
to involve impartial local and religious leaders in decision making and policy formulation for 
new or existing reintegration or other programmes.  
 
In the absence of reintegration frameworks that promote dialogue and inclusivity, this 
study has shown that communities are likely to be distrustful of government and law 
enforcement agencies. Equally, they will look at reintegration programmes as initiatives 
imposed on the locals by the government. Civic education is also important to help families 
and communities to be aware of existing reintegration programmes and how they can benefit 






Juma & Githigaro: Communities’ Perceptions of Reintegration of Al-Shabaab Returnees in 








ISSN: 2363-9849          
reintegration and reconciliation efforts since, as this study has shown, again, various aspects 
of community life rely on the blessings of the traditional elders’ authority. 
 
Recommendation 2: Engage Civil Society  
The level of trust in centralized institutions and the government is low in the two 
regions studied. Civil society actors are the people closest to the communities and 
programming that uses them as intermediaries might have a greater and better impact. Civil 
society organizations also make key partners based on their topical knowledge and local 
access. Building relationships between civil society and security actors would be a good start 
to develop information and knowledge sharing as well as joint research protocols.  
 
Recommendation 3: Employ evidence-based practice in CVE  
Research, and subsequently data, is lacking on how specific interventions work or fail 
in CVE in Kenya. There is need for more research and data on how communities experience 
integration. While there is some research on CVE interventions in coastal Kenya, there is 
minimal focus on the experiences of host communities on reintegration matters. Building a 
research base through academic partnerships will ensure localisation of solutions and that 
communities own reintegration processes. As Freese (2014) aptly points out, evidence is what 
truly tells us what is happening on the ground and without it, there is the danger of opinion, 
guesswork, or emotion, which can be poisonous to decision making. 
 
Recommendation 4: Frequently evaluate reintegration programmes 
Stakeholders in CVE should carry out independent evaluations to both current and 
new reintegration programmes. This way, the objectives, implementation, underlying 
assumptions and degree of success of the programmes can be assessed. This is key to ensure 
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Recommendation 5: Address the local structural conditions and grievances that promote 
radicalization  
It is indeed unrealistic to overlook such issues as joblessness, poverty and other socio-
economic grievances and expect meaningful reintegration outcomes.  For the case of coastal 
Kenya, it is important to address discriminatory policies and unfair targeting by government 
agents towards Muslims as well as negative stereotyping. Nesting reintegration efforts and 
programmes into national efforts of economic, social and political reforms will promote the 
success of reintegration programmes.  
 
Recommendation 6: Anchor reintegration of returnees in Kenya, on a solid policy framework 
One of the major criticisms of Kenya’s Amnesty and Reintegration Programme from 
this research is the lack of a legal structure or policy. Many other challenges are because of 
this, including the absence of safety assurances for returnees, mistrust between stakeholders 
and poor community engagement. The government, in consultation with all relevant 
stakeholders, should draw up a policy framework, upon which to anchor reintegration of 
returnees. This framework will guide on the due processes to be followed by all persons and 
institutions handling returnees, establish a clear chain of command and detail the step-by-step 




This study set out to investigate community perceptions of reintegration of returning foreign 
terrorist fighters from Al-Shabaab in coastal Kenya. The findings show the importance of 
incorporating communities into reintegration programmes as equal and respected partners, 
alongside government agencies, civil society and any other stakeholders. While communities 
in Kwale and Mombasa are receptive to the idea of returning FTFs’ reintegration, there is a 
full range of social issues that hinders their active participation in the processes and 
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share ideas, contribute to decision making, or even debate concerns on reintegration of 
returnees. This has built general distrust, misconceptions, and stigma towards returnees, and 
propagated their negative labelling.   
Other than pointing out how the host communities experience reintegration, the 
primary contribution of this study has been to stimulate conversations for further research and 
exploration, which can help draw plans for wholesome reintegration for both returnees and 
communities. The study has shown that community involvement, participation and support 
are vital ingredients for reintegration, yet they remain highly underutilized in the two areas of 
Kwale and Mombasa Counties. The role of communities in the decision-making processes 
around reintegration to better address their own basic needs and those of the returnees is vital 
to ensure effective transitions. The National Counter Terrorism Centre should deliberate with 
the communities at the centre of reintegration efforts, to make state solutions more effective 
and ensure that the universal principles of accountability and acceptability, proactivity and 
any other support, are combined by those drafting reintegration programmes, to address the 
needs of all involved parties.  
Further research should thus consider the comprehensive approach that recognizes 
attending to the social needs of both returnees and affected communities. Another key study 
area for researchers in VE should be the impact of media in creating perceptions around 
reintegration, and how media framing and reporting may influence perceptions. This is 
important because the style of media broadcasted intrinsically shapes citizen knowledge of 
issues happening in the country. While this article focused on the community experiences in 
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